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35 
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER 
 
By Caroline Reed 
 
 
The directive was clear: “You will enter the continent of Europe 
and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations 
aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.”
1
  
Dwight D. Eisenhower believed strongly in the importance of compromise 
and teamwork when leading an army.  As Supreme Allied Commander in 
World War II, Eisenhower strove to follow his philosophy of cooperation 
during the planning for D-Day and beyond in Operation Overlord. 
 Eisenhower believed deeply in a team philosophy when working 
with the army, especially if one was a commander of some kind.  To 
Eisenhower, “any action which hurt the creation of an effective team was 
contemptible.”
2
  He had come to this philosophy under the influence of his 
mentor, Fox Conner.
3
  Comparing war to football, Ike believed that both 
required hard work, cooperation, and leadership qualities to be successful.
4
  
 When George Patton first introduced Eisenhower to Fox Conner he 
started a friendship and mentorship that influenced the rest of Eisenhower’s 
career.  From their first meeting both men impressed with each other.  Conner 
was impressed by the answers Ike gave him to his military questions, and in 
turn Ike was impressed that Conner asked them.
 5
   In 1922, Eisenhower was 
transferred to Panama under the command of Conner.   
During Ike’s time in Panama, Conner taught him a great many 
things about military history, maps, international politics, and Ike himself as a 
soldier.  Eisenhower was never fascinated with military history until Conner 
introduced it to him in a way that was more interesting and thought provoking 
than the rote memorization required at West Point.
6
  From then on, Ike 
devoured books about military history and theory.  He studied maps 
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extensively and constantly worked with Conner to create routes and battle 
plans in case the Panama Canal was attacked.
7
  Conner taught Eisenhower “to 
submit everything in the form of a five-paragraph field order.”
8
  This taught 
Eisenhower how to explain battle plans and tactics thoroughly.  In short, 
Conner taught Eisenhower important aspects of being a soldier that could 
only be learned through experience and he taught it in a way that captured 
Ike’s attention. 
Most importantly though, were Conner’s ideas about the 
international situation of the time.  Conner was convinced, just by reading the 
Treaty of Versailles that another big war was upon them.
9
  He stressed to 
Eisenhower the inevitability of this fact:  “Conner’s experience in France in 
the First World War had convinced him that without strong leadership the 
Allies might again become what he called ‘their own worst enemies.’”
10
  
Conner did not want the United States to have to ally herself with other 
nations in another great war.  However, he recognized the necessity of an 
alliance so he stressed to Eisenhower that it had to be done differently than in 
World War I.
11
 Cooperation between the Allied powers would be key in 
another major war and it required a commander who knew how to 
accomplish that.  Eisenhower became the strong leader that Conner foresaw 
to be the savior of the Allied cause.
12
   
While Eisenhower did not give full credit to Conner for the way he 
conducted himself as Supreme Allied Commander, he did acknowledge that, 
aside from his parents, Conner was the most influential person in his life.
13
  
However, once World War II began, Ike almost certainly recognized 
Conner’s amazing foresight and the truth of his words.  Conner taught him so 
much about war during their stay in Panama that Ike would have been foolish 
to ignore him. 
Ike worked on his ability to cooperate with difficult people and 
overcome difficult situations during his time in the Philippines.  In 1935 
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Eisenhower was sent to work under General Douglas MacArthur in the 
Philippines.  The United States was trying to get the Filipino Army ready for 
independence.  MacArthur, Eisenhower, and the rest of their staff went to the 
Philippines to aid in this effort.  The impossibility of the job they attempted to 
do and the frustrations that MacArthur created for everyone, especially 
Eisenhower, served to prepare Ike for the enormous task of leading D-Day.
14
  
Eisenhower had already worked under MacArthur in the United States, but in 
many ways it was even more difficult to do in the Philippines. MacArthur 
was a hard person to work for in general.  The relationship between 
Eisenhower and MacArthur was a rocky one but it worked.
15
  Both men had 
big egos and big tempers, and Eisenhower was not afraid to stand up to him, 
despite the fact that MacArthur was his senior officer.
16
  Ike continuously had 
to mediate between MacArthur and the President of the Philippines, Manuel 
Quezon, because there were constant misunderstandings.  Life was better and 
easier whenever MacArthur and Quezon cooperated.
17
  In the Philippines 
Eisenhower learned how to deal with difficult and sometimes egotistical 
leaders as well as how to resolve disputes, both of which were helpful skills 
during his days as Allied Commander. 
 Immediately before his promotion, General Eisenhower was the 
Allied Commander in the Mediterranean region of the war, so he had 
experience on the ground as well as experience working with Allied forces.  
Interestingly enough, Eisenhower’s appointment as Supreme Allied 
Commander seemed to be almost an afterthought by Franklin Roosevelt.  
Once it was decided that a British general would not lead Overlord, all eyes 
moved to which commander FDR would choose.
18
  Most assumed George 
Marshall would be chosen; Eisenhower was not even under consideration in 
the fall of 1943.  However, as time went on, FDR felt more keenly the need to 
keep Marshall in the United States as Chief of Staff because he excelled at his 
job.
19
  On December 7, 1943 FDR met Eisenhower and without introduction 
gave him command of Overlord.  FDR himself said that “’Eisenhower is the 
best politician among the military men.”
20
  Indeed, Winston Churchill and 
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Eisenhower, despite their many arguments, had a better relationship and 
understanding of one another than Churchill and Marshall did.
21
  This good 
relationship between the two men proved to be important, as D-Day planning 
got under way. 
Almost immediately after his appointment as Supreme Allied 
Commander, Eisenhower began suggesting men to be his fellow 
commanders.  He knew he needed men he could trust and who valued Allied 
cooperation.  According to D’Este, “Eisenhower placed his personal stamp of 
approval on every division commander or higher…. No officer was selected 
whom he did not know personally.”
22
  As early as 1943, Eisenhower wanted 
Omar Bradley as the American army group commander and either Harold 
Alexander or Bernard Montgomery as the overall ground commander.  He 
was confident in Bradley’s ability and he knew that either Alexander or 
Montgomery, though British, trusted Bradley.
23
  In other words, they would 
work well together.  Eisenhower seemed very optimistic about the team 
working for him when he wrote to Field Marshal William Birdwood that 
“happily, both countries have given to me, as immediate subordinates, leaders 
of proven worth… working along with these men are British and American 
leaders” whose only thought was of duty.
24
  In the days ahead it was 
extremely important that the officers had the ability to work together during 
the best of times so that when the situation became very stressful, their 
disagreements might not be so harsh.   
As the commander of an Allied force, Eisenhower had the daunting 
task of dealing with Churchill’s big personality.  However, because of his 
experience with MacArthur the task must have been easier for Ike.  In fact, 
Churchill and Eisenhower had a good relationship and understanding of one 
another.
25
  Their disagreements were nearly always resolved.  As the military 
commander, Eisenhower stood his ground when he disagreed with the Prime 
Minister.  Eisenhower even charmed Charles de Gaulle.  Ike and de Gaulle 
had a rough relationship but Ike made a little headway to kindness by 
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flattering de Gaulle about his military wisdom.
26
  In one letter, Eisenhower 
gave credit to de Gaulle for the elimination of some misunderstandings 
between the Free French and Americans.
27
  Their relationship was never 
perfect but they made things work for the sake of the war. 
Ike’s easy-going manner extended to his fellow soldiers and 
commanders.  Eisenhower was an excellent commander in that he “seemed 
able to ask an appropriate question or produce a suitable comment that 
established an immediate bond” with soldiers.
28
  He was popular with his 
own American troops and with the British troops as well.  He was keen to 
make sure that every soldier emulated the respect that he showed for men on 
both sides.  In a letter to Maxwell Taylor, Ike was clearly disappointed that he 
had to deal with misconduct from American soldiers towards British soldiers 
and anxious that it not happen again.
29
  Ike expected his fellow commanders 
and soldiers to follow the same line of cooperation and alliance that he did.  
Ike’s naval aide, Harry Butcher, said in one of his speeches to SHAEF 
commanders, that Eisenhower “emphasized that in an Allied Command such 
as this he expects thoughts and words which indicate nationality to be 
erased.”
30
  
One man on whom Eisenhower had to rely more than others was 
Bernard Montgomery.  As Field Marshall, he was one of Ike’s right hand men 
in Operation Overlord.  Although Montgomery also considered cooperation 
to be important, he often left that aspect to Eisenhower.  Montgomery was so 
strong and confident in himself that it was difficult for him to get along with 
his allies.
31
  He believed that it was important to be close to his men but his 
personal qualities and supreme confidence made appeasement difficult for 
him.
32
  Eisenhower’s self-control and ability to appease allowed the two men 
to maintain a good working relationship.
33
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From his earlier Allied operations during the war, Eisenhower 
recognized the need for a staff that integrated ground, air, naval, and 
logistics.
34
 Operation Overlord was a major coordination between two 
countries so everything in the planning, down to the last detail, had to work 
together like a well-oiled machine.  With that in mind, Ike insisted on a single 
headquarters for those commanders and officers participating in Overlord.
35
  
He wanted his commanders in each area to see themselves as occupying both 
the role of the staff worker who helped develop plans and of the executor of 
those plans on the ground, air, or water.
36
  He wanted to have a single, overall 
ground commander to lead both British and American forces and also 
coordinate with their respective air forces.
37
  He actually saw separate British 
and American commanders as “destructive of the essential coordination 
between ground and air forces.”
38
 
COSSAC, or the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, 
formed before Eisenhower joined as the official Commander.  COSSAC did 
not have much direction before Eisenhower.  Their main accomplishment was 
the choice of Normandy as the landing site.  However, that in and of itself 
was “one of the best examples of Anglo-American cooperation of the entire 
war” because they finally untangled months and months of planning.
39
  
Eisenhower agreed with the invasion site but also recommended that they 
widen the invasion and make it more of a frontal assault than a pincer.
40
  It 
would be easier to capture the beach and subsequent towns if the assault were 
bigger, faster, and stronger in number.   
In Ambrose’s words, “a successful Overlord meant, in practice, 
getting ashore and staying.”
41
  There were many, many issues to work out in 
the coming operation.  The operation would be the biggest undertaking of any 
                                                          
 34 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948), 
221. 
 35 Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2002), 
484. 
 36 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948), 
221. 
 37 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, 
ed. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970), 3:1610. 
 38 Ibid., 3:1609. 
 39 Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2002), 
470. 
 40 R. J. Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), 145. 
 41 Stephen E. Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight 
D. Eisenhower (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970), 329. 
Supreme Allied Commander 
 
41 
Ally in the war.  However, there were three main factors on which the 
operation relied.  First, the Allies needed to be able to supply the soldiers on 
the ground.  Second, they needed to keep the Germans from a sufficient 
build-up of arms that would stop them. Finally, of course, the Germans could 
not know what was coming.
42
   
The first of these factors was a huge naval undertaking the likes of 
which served as a perfect example of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theories about 
sea power.
43
  The problem of this huge undertaking was not how to get the 
ships organized and to the right location.  As Richard Overy points out, that 
“was a task for which British and American seamanship was well 
equipped.”
44
  Rather, the main problem was that there was no place for the 
ships to anchor.  Eisenhower said that the solution was “a project so unique as 
to be classed by many scoffers as completely fantastic.”
45
  The Allies 
essentially created their own harbor on D-Day out of old ships that they sunk 
off the coast.  Also constructed were pieces called a “mulberries” that 
allowed vehicles and equipment to drive off the ships and onto the beach.
46
 
One of the biggest points of contention was the proposed 
Transportation Plan that aimed to destroy French communications in order to 
keep the Germans from a build-up of arms in France.
47
  Even though 
Eisenhower sought to use the air force only to destroy key communication 
points and rail lines rather than population centers, many politicians, 
including Churchill, were horrified by the possible loss of civilian life.
48
  
Eisenhower understood the importance of preserving civilian life, yet as a 
military commander he also understood that in war the ends must justify the 
means.  In fact, he was often frustrated by the fact that many people did not 
recognize that the decisions he had to make were often difficult and risky.
49
  
During his time as assistant army chief of staff, Ike’s secretary said of him 
that “every problem was carefully analyzed” and that he had an ability “to 
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arrive at quick and confident decisions.”
50
  This decision was no different.  
Once they received the ‘okay’ for the plan, Ike and his staff proved they made 
the right choice.  The casualty numbers were not nearly as high as everyone 
thought they would be.
51
  While the effects on the railways were minimal, the 
air force did much damage to the “bridges and tunnels connecting the 
invasion area with the east.”
52
  The value of this plan was justified by the 
damage it did to the communications and transportation of the Germans, 
especially where the invasion area was concerned. 
The third key piece to the plan of Overlord was called “Bodyguard.”  
Instead of trying to completely disguise the build-up of arms for Overlord, 
Allied intelligence decided to convince the Germans that an attack was going 
to happen in a completely different spot and time.
53
  The Allies wished to 
convince the Germans that an attack would happen at Calais and in 
Scandinavia.  To do this they created an entire fake army called FUSAG 
complete with dummy camps, fake supply depots, and rubber tanks in the 
southeast of England.
54
  The deception effort required much cooperation on 
the part of United States and British Allied intelligence.  They had to make 
sure they were sending out similar signals, and all politicians, commanders, 
and soldiers involved had to keep Overlord a complete secret while following 
along with the deception in a convincing way.  The plan was such a risky 
gamble that even Eisenhower had a difficult time believing that it would 
work.  He merely hoped that it would “tie down one or two German 
divisions” for maybe a few days.
55
 
Another major disagreement that occurred during the planning stage 
was about how much to rely on the air force.  The landing on Utah Beach was 
essential to gaining Cherbourg, but it could not be taken without the air force.  
Because the beach was impossible to land on, the staff planned to drop 
United States paratroopers onto the beach.
56
  Many people, such as Air 
Marshall Trafford Leigh-Mallory were feared the possible losses that the anti-
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aircraft around the beach would cause to the air force.  Leigh-Mallory was 
adamant that the Utah landings were a huge waste of life.
57
  Ike contended 
that the whole operation could not happen without the Utah landing and the 
Utah landing could not happen without this airborne assault.
58
  His decision 
was actually popular with the airborne commanders because it showed that 
Ike had confidence in them to carry out their duties.  The attack was carried 
out as planned, and the airborne operations were a success with fewer losses 
than expected.
59
  Leigh-Mallory regretted doubting Eisenhower’s decision 
and told him so in an apology letter sent on June 7.
60
  Just as he did with the 
Transportation Plan, Eisenhower proved his ability to make confident 
decisions that made him worthy of his title Supreme Commander. 
Carlo D’Este says, “No commander in military history faced a more 
daunting task than the one [Eisenhower] did in 1944”, because “he was 
charged with welding together the largest force ever assembled.”
61
  Overlord 
was an Allied operation that called for nothing less than the destruction of the 
German army.  In order to succeed, Eisenhower put his earlier experiences 
with compromise and teamwork in the army into practice.  Because of 
Eisenhower’s efforts as Supreme Allied Commander, Operation Overlord 
became one of the most successful allied operations in history.
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